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A CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF THE THRIVING
“INDUSTRY” OF DEATH TOURISM
Alexander R. Safyan*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 7, 2009, distinguished English conductor Sir Edward
Downes traveled with his wife, Lady Joan, to Zurich, Switzerland.1
Three days later, the couple visited the assisted suicide clinic Dignitas,
where workers provided them with a clear, liquid drink that would
enable them to end their lives together.2 Sir Edward and Lady Joan
drank the “cocktail of barbiturates,” lay next to each other holding
hands, and died within minutes.3 Lady Joan was seventy-four years old,
and in the final stages of terminal cancer; Sir Edward was eighty-five
years old, and nearly blind and deaf.4 However, unlike his wife, Sir
Edward was not terminally ill.5
This story sparked new controversy surrounding the practices of
assisted suicide clinics such as Dignitas, which offer patients the ability
to peacefully and painlessly end their lives. Yet this story is only one of
several highly publicized reports of individuals traveling abroad in
search of assistance in committing suicide. For example, in January
2003, a seventy-four-year-old man named Reginald Crew, who had
been diagnosed with motor neuron disease, became one of the first

* J.D., Loyola Law School Los Angeles, 2011; B.A., University of Southern California, 2008. I
would like to thank my parents for their unconditional love and support. I would also like to
thank my friends Dan Hauptman, who gave me the idea for this note, and Jordan Ludwig and
Michael Pearson, for proofreading it and providing input.
1. John F. Burns, With Help, Conductor and Wife Ended Lives, N.Y. TIMES (July 14,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/world/europe/15britain.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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British citizens to die with the help of Dignitas’s services.6 In April
2003, a British couple’s decision to die at Dignitas generated
widespread criticism of the clinic’s practices because neither person was
terminally ill.7 Robert Stokes, age fifty-nine, suffered from epilepsy,
while his wife, Jennifer, age fifty-three, had back problems and
diabetes.8 Perhaps the most controversial story surfaced in September
2008, when twenty-three-year-old Daniel James, who had been
paralyzed from a rugby injury, ended his life at Dignitas with his
parents by his side.9 The prevalence of such stories has led many
authors and commentators to popularize the term “death tourism,”
which describes the phenomenon of citizens traveling to foreign
countries in search of assistance in taking their lives.10
The emergence of death tourism as a new “industry” has revived
international debate regarding the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia. Indeed, several countries have recently taken
steps to address the phenomenon. In February 2010, following a fivemonth-long public response period, the Director of Public Prosecutions
in the United Kingdom issued new guidelines designed to clarify the
circumstances under which individuals planning to assist another in
suicide could expect to face prosecution.11 Similarly, following its own
several-month-long consultation process, the Federal Council in
Switzerland recently announced that it planned to introduce stricter
regulations against assisted suicide.12 Other countries, however, have
dismissed death tourism as a potential problem, either because their
laws expressly prohibit it or because their culture prevents it from
6. See Fiona Fleck, Dignitas “Helps Physically Healthy to Die”, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 26,
2003, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/switzerland/1420106/
Dignitas-helps-physically-healthy-to-die.html.
7. UK Couple Die at Suicide Clinic, BBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2003, 17:33 GMT), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2948365.stm.
8. Id.
9. See Daniel Foggo, Why Daniel James Chose to Die, SUNDAY TIMES (Oct. 19, 2008),
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4969423.ece.
10. Rohith Srinivas, Exploring the Potential for American Death Tourism, 13 MICH. ST. U.
J. MED. & L. 91, 94 (2009); see Hilary White, Switzerland Refuses to Alter Assisted Suicide Law
to Nix Death Tourism, LIFESITENEWS.COM (June 2, 2006, 11:15 EST), http://www.lifesitenews.
com/ldn/2006/jun/06060210.html.
11. A Public Consultation on the DPP’s Interim Policy for Prosecutors on Assisted Suicide,
CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_index.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2011).
12. Press Release, Swiss Federal Council, Specific Regulations for Organised Assisted
Suicide in Switzerland; Swiss Federal Council Acknowledges Results of Consultation Process
(Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.admin.ch/br/aktuell/00091/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=35187
[hereinafter Swiss Federal Council Press Release].
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occurring.13 In any case, leaders agree that they would not like to see
their countries become breeding grounds for “death tourists.”14
15
With reports of death tourism on the rise, and criticism of the
increasingly ineffective safeguards of local assisted suicide laws
mounting, the question becomes: Should international law do anything
to address this phenomenon? If the answer to this question is “yes,” then
the logical subsequent question is: What form should a resolution take,
such that it preserves individual nations’ sovereignty while
simultaneously promoting the integrity of obligations imposed by
domestic law?
This Note asserts that regulation of death tourism is an essential
step in defusing the international community’s concerns over the
controversial practice. Further, this Note posits that the most effective
tool for curtailing death tourism is the adoption of an instrument of “soft
16
law,” which would grant countries flexibility in shaping their
responsibilities toward assisted suicide of non-citizens, as well as
provide a less formal, and thus more conciliatory, framework for
compliance with those responsibilities. It is important to note that this
Note does not undertake a debate as to the moral, ethical, or legal
justifications for or against assisted suicide. Rather, this Note argues
that—notwithstanding one’s personal views about the legality of the
practice—a system where non-terminally ill individuals can travel
abroad and enlist the services of death clinics to help them end their
lives offends both notions of international comity and respect for the
obligations of domestic law.
Part II of this Note sets forth the various end-of-life procedures
available to patients and examines some of the principal arguments
surrounding the use of those procedures. Part III analyzes and compares
the laws of four countries with contrasting positions on the legitimacy
of end-of-life procedures: the United Kingdom, the United States, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland. The choice (and order of presentation) of
these four countries represents a broad sweep over the spectrum of end13. See Srinivas, supra note 10, at 102–03.
14. See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Switzerland Government Official Wants Assisted Suicide Death
Tourism to Stop, LIFENEWS.COM (July 14, 2008, 9:00 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/bio2510.
html (Swiss Minister Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf seeking to curb death tourism in Switzerland).
15. Id. (stating that as of May 2008, the number of individuals, especially British citizens,
choosing to end their lives at Dignitas was on the rise).
16. Part IV of this Note elaborates on the definition of soft law and explores the benefits of
utilizing a soft law instrument rather than an instrument of “hard law,” such as a binding treaty.
For now, a sufficient working definition of soft law is an informal, non-binding instrument, such
as a resolution or recommendation, that can be viewed as a third source of international law, in
addition to treaties and customary international law.
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of-life jurisprudence, and features countries whose laws move from
most restrictive to least restrictive. Additionally, Part III considers
which of these countries presents the greatest potential for death
tourism, affording special attention to recent proposals for change
introduced by the countries’ policymakers. Part IV articulates a
proposal for international regulation of death tourism through the means
of a soft law instrument and explains why such an instrument would be
favorable to a hard law alternative. Finally, Part V concludes that
although non-binding in nature, “soft” regulation of death tourism could
lead to the desired effect of influencing countries’ behavior toward each
other’s citizens and increasing their respect for the laws of their
sovereign neighbors.
II. DEFINING AND CONCEPTUALIZING VARIOUS END-OF-LIFE
PROCEDURES
A. Defining the Terminology
Before engaging in a comparative analysis of the laws in different
countries governing end-of-life procedures, it is necessary to identify
and define the terminology that describes these procedures. The first
important distinction to make is between assisted suicide and
17
euthanasia. While many believe these terms are synonymous, a more
accurate definition focuses on who ultimately brings about the patient’s
18
death. As the word “suicide” suggests, assisted suicide entails the
patient ultimately taking her own life. The American Medical
19
Association defines physician-assisted suicide (PAS) as “a physician
facilitat[ing] a patient’s death by providing the necessary means and/or
20
information to enable the patient to perform the life-ending act.” Thus,
under this scenario, while the patient receives assistance from a
physician—either in the form of medication, instruction, or advice—the
key component is that the patient herself carries out the final act, rather
17. See Lara L. Manzione, Is There a Right to Die?: A Comparative Study of Three
Societies (Australia, Netherlands, United States), 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 443, 445 (2002)
(noting that “[t]he term euthanasia is more routinely used by the population at large as a general
one to mean any form of hastened death”).
18. See Srinivas, supra note 10, at 94.
19. Although assisted suicide does not have to involve a physician, most commentators
prefer this term since it is generally the case that a physician is required to provide the patient
with the appropriate means to end her life (i.e., by writing a prescription). See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.245.020(1) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2003).
20. Opinion 2.211: Physician-Assisted Suicide, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org
/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.shtml (last visited
Sept. 6, 2011).
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than the physician. Conversely, euthanasia, which originates from the
21
Greek eu, meaning “good,” and thanatos, meaning “death,” involves
22
the physician acting to cause the patient’s death. The physician will
most often do this by administering a lethal injection or removing the
patient from some form of life-support.23 Whatever the action, the
defining characteristic of euthanasia is that the physician, not the
patient, carries out the ultimate life-ending act.
Euthanasia can further be classified as active or passive, and
voluntary or involuntary. Active euthanasia involves a physician or
24
other person directly acting to end a patient’s life. An example of this
would be a physician injecting a patient with a drug that causes the
patient’s death. On the other hand, passive euthanasia entails foregoing
25
or discontinuing life-sustaining treatment. For instance, a physician
may refrain from inserting a feeding tube into a patient’s body or he
may disconnect the patient from life-support. Passive euthanasia is
allowed in most countries, as this practice is generally associated with a
patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, rather than a request that the
26
physician “kill” her. Most countries that criminalize euthanasia
specifically proscribe active euthanasia. These countries view active
27
euthanasia as a form of “killing,” and distinguish between “killing”
28
and “letting die,” the latter of which they consider morally acceptable.
Though the line between killing and letting die may be blurry, the
29
distinction between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia is clear. This
distinction plays a crucial role in the moral debate surrounding end-oflife procedures. Voluntary euthanasia refers to a situation where a
21. Manzione, supra note 17, at 445.
22. See Wendy N. Weigand, Has the Time Come for Doctor Death: Should PhysicianAssisted Suicide be Legalized?, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 321, 322–23 (1992–93).
23. Id. at 322.
24. See Lindsay Pfeffer, Note, A Final Plea for “Death With Dignity”: A Proposal for the
Modification and Approval of the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill in the United
Kingdom, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 497, 510 (2007).
25. See N. Ferreira, Latest Legal and Social Developments in the Euthanasia Debate: Bad
Moral Consciences and Political Unrest, 26 MED. & L. 387, 389 (2007).
26. See Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the New Property Regime in Human
Bodies and Body Parts, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 55–57 (2002) (explaining the
distinction between refusal of life-sustaining treatment, which is a constitutional right recognized
in the United States, and assisted suicide or [active] euthanasia).
27. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Democratic
World: A Legal Overview, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3 (2003).
28. See Kelly Green, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: Safeguarding Against the
“Slippery Slope”—The Netherlands Versus the United States, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
639, 645 (2003).
29. See Srinivas, supra note 10, at 95.
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physician ends a patient’s life at the request of the patient and with the
30
patient’s informed consent. Involuntary euthanasia, however, refers to
a case where a patient has not consented, either because she is
physically or mentally unable to, or because she has expressly stated
31
that she does not wish to be euthanized. Some describe the former
situation—where the patient is unable to consent—as non-voluntary
euthanasia, and the latter situation—where the patient has indicated that
32
she does not want to be euthanized—as involuntary euthanasia. For
purposes of this Note, however, this distinction is irrelevant.
B. Competing Positions
Arguments for and against these aforementioned procedures
abound, most of which are enveloped in larger debates concerning
moral, ethical, and legal issues. The arguments in support of PAS and
euthanasia center around two main principles: “personal autonomy and
33
the right to be free from undue suffering.” With regard to the first
principle, proponents contend that individuals have a right to self34
determination. In other words, people are free to make decisions that
affect their own lives. The underlying premise of this argument is the
belief that the right to choose how to live one’s life necessarily
35
encompasses the right to choose how to end it. The second principle,
the right to be free from extreme suffering, is founded upon notions of
mercy and compassion. This principle maintains that individuals should
not contribute to the pain and suffering of others, but rather, should
36
alleviate such pain whenever possible, including by ending an afflicted
individual’s life. Advocates of these two principles urge their countries
to pass laws permitting PAS and voluntary euthanasia under the proper
circumstances.
On the other side of the debate, those who oppose life-ending
procedures argue that a physician should never be permitted to
knowingly and voluntarily take a patient’s life. This argument is deeply
rooted in several fundamental beliefs. First, most opponents of PAS and
euthanasia contend that a theoretical “right to die” never outweighs the
37
value of human life. In support of their position, opponents point to
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See Ferreira, supra note 25, at 390.
Id. at 392.
See Srinivas, supra note 10, at 95.
See Green, supra note 28, at 642.
Id. at 643.
Id.
Id.
See Ferreira, supra note 25, at 391.
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the use of modern drugs to control pain and new developments in
38
medicine that will extend patients’ lives further than ever imagined.
Second, opponents of PAS and euthanasia emphasize the difficulty
physicians face in determining whether the patient has voluntarily
39
consented. This difficulty stems from such problems as ascertaining
whether the patient is rational or competent to consent in the first
place.40 Third, and perhaps most controversially, those who disapprove
of PAS and euthanasia raise “slippery slope” arguments against these
41
practices. These arguments theorize that the legalization of PAS and
euthanasia will lead to widespread abuse of vulnerable groups of
42
people. Specifically, the poor and the elderly may feel pressure to
prematurely end their lives so as not to impose financial or emotional
43
burdens on their families. In addition, the mentally ill and disabled
may be misled into requesting death, either by their loved ones or by
44
their treating physicians. Regardless of the specific objection, most
opponents agree that the proliferation of life-ending procedures would
45
result in a deterioration of the physician-patient relationship, as it
would erode the trust in the relationship as well as the view that
physicians are healers.46
III. COMPARATIVE LAW AND THE POTENTIAL FOR DEATH TOURISM
This section analyzes and compares the laws regulating end-of-life
procedures in the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland. In the course of this analysis, this section also
considers the extent to which each of these countries represents a
potential death tourism destination.
A. The United Kingdom
With its policymakers endlessly debating the legalization of PAS
and its citizens comprising the largest number of people traveling
abroad to be assisted in death, the United Kingdom is at the forefront of
the death tourism phenomenon. The U.K.’s House of Lords has
repeatedly rejected attempts to pass a bill permitting assisted suicide,
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 392.
See id. at 391.
Id.
Id.; Green, supra note 28, at 646.
See Green, supra note 28, at 646.
See id. at 647–48.
See id.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 649–50.
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and popular sentiment in favor of the practice has gone largely
47
unheeded. Only the recent decision by the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP) to promulgate new guidelines regarding the
prosecution of assisted suicide violators has produced any hope for a
change in the status quo.48
In 1961, Parliament passed the Suicide Act, which eliminated
suicide as a crime while simultaneously introducing a new offense for
49
assisting another in suicide. The Act provided that “[a] person who
aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by
another to commit suicide” would be subject to imprisonment for up to
50
fourteen years. This punishment remains one of the most severe of its
51
kind in Europe. Not coincidentally, therefore, the United Kingdom has
experienced perhaps the greatest public clamor for relaxation of its
assisted suicide laws.
1. The Case of Diane Pretty
The first highly publicized challenge to the U.K.’s assisted suicide
ban came in 2000, when a woman named Diane Pretty petitioned the
DPP to declare that her husband would not be prosecuted for helping
52
her commit suicide. Ms. Pretty was diagnosed with motor neuron
disease—a condition that would ultimately paralyze her—and sought
53
permission for her husband to assist her in peacefully ending her life.
The DPP refused her request, leading Ms. Pretty to bring her challenge
54
to the judiciary.
The Divisional Court dismissed Ms. Pretty’s claim. It found that
the DPP did not have power to grant immunity to Ms. Pretty’s husband
for future or proposed criminal conduct, and that the Suicide Act 1961
was not incompatible with the European Convention on Human
47. Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 521; see Lords Block Assisted Dying Bill, BBC NEWS (May 12,
2006, 16:43 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4763067.stm.
48. Caroline Davies, Assisted Suicide Guidelines Will Ease Fears, Says DPP, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 23, 2009, 21:23 BST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/sep/23/assisted-suicideguidelines-dpp.
49. Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60, §§ 1–2 (Eng.).
50. Id. § 2(1).
51. Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 498.
52. John Keown, European Court of Human Rights: Death in Strasbourg—Assisted
Suicide, the Pretty Case, and the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L.
722, 723 (2003); see Suicide Act, 1961, supra note 49, § 2(4) (stating that “no proceedings shall
be instituted for [assisted suicide] except by or with the consent of the Director of Public
Prosecutions”).
53. Keown, supra note 52, at 722.
54. Id. at 723.
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55

Rights. Ms. Pretty appealed the Court’s decision to the House of
56
Lords, which also rejected her claim. Finally, Ms. Pretty brought her
case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
Before the ECHR, Ms. Pretty asserted two primary arguments
under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
57
and several alternative arguments under Articles 8, 9, and 14. First,
Ms. Pretty asserted that Article 2, which protects the right to life, also
58
guarantees a negative right, the right to choose not to live. The ECHR,
however, found that Article 2 was concerned with the protection and
preservation of life and could not, without a distortion of language, be
59
interpreted to also confer the right to choose to die. Ms. Pretty’s
second argument focused on Article 3 of the Convention, which states,
“[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
60
treatment or punishment.” Ms. Pretty claimed that the State’s
prohibition on assisted suicide and the DPP’s refusal to grant
prospective immunity to her husband constituted inhuman and
61
degrading treatment in violation of the Convention. The Court rejected
this argument as well, explaining that Article 3 only required states to
ensure that individuals within their jurisdictions were not subjected to
inhuman treatment, but did not require them to actively provide
62
treatment to individuals who required medical care.
In addition to the aforementioned arguments, Ms. Pretty raised
alternative arguments under Articles 8, 9, and 14 of the Convention.
Based on Article 8, which prohibits interference in individuals’ lives
63
except when necessary to protect interests such as public safety,
Ms. Pretty claimed that the State’s assisted suicide ban violated her
right to privacy and self-determination.64 The Court found that
interference by the State in this matter was justified because the State
55. Pretty v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [2001] EWHC (Admin) 788, [31]–[32], [66] (Eng.).
56. Keown, supra note 52, at 723.
57. See id. (discussing each of Ms. Pretty’s arguments before the ECHR).
58. See id.; Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms states, “[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.” European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter ECHR].
59. See Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 4–8 (2002);
Keown, supra note 52.
60. ECHR, supra note 58, art. 3.
61. See Keown, supra note 52, at 724.
62. Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 9.
63. ECHR, supra note 58, art. 8.
64. See Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 4.
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had the right to use criminal law to protect vulnerable groups of people
(such as the terminally ill) and to regulate activities that endangered the
65
safety of others. Under Article 9, Ms. Pretty argued that the State’s
prohibition on assisted suicide violated her freedom of thought,
66
conscience, and religion. The Court quickly rejected this contention,
finding that Ms. Pretty’s views on assisted suicide were not
67
manifestations of religious belief or thought. Finally, with respect to
68
Article 14, which prohibits discrimination under the Convention,
Ms. Pretty claimed that a blanket ban on assisted suicide discriminated
between individuals who were physically able to commit suicide
without assistance and those who were unable to do so.69 As with her
other claims, the ECHR refused to entertain Ms. Pretty’s contention. It
concluded that the State had legitimate safety reasons for refusing to
distinguish between people who were capable of committing suicide on
70
their own and those who required assistance.
2. Recent Developments in the United Kingdom
Since the ECHR’s dismissal of the Pretty case, the United
Kingdom has witnessed several key developments in the assisted
suicide/death tourism story. In 2004, Lord Joel Joffe introduced the
Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, modeled after Oregon’s
71
Death with Dignity Act, discussed below in Part III.B. The House of
Lords formed a Select Committee to review the Bill, and the committee
published an extensive report with statistical findings, analyses of other
72
countries’ laws, and recommendations for improving the bill.
Following the report, Lord Joffe submitted a new version of the bill in
2005. The bill’s stated purpose was to “[e]nable an adult who has
capacity and who is suffering unbearably as a result of a terminal illness
to receive medical assistance to die at his own considered and persistent
73
request.” The proposed legislation authorized a physician to assist a
patient in suicide by prescribing lethal medication, or, in the case of a
patient who was unable to orally ingest that medication, by providing
65. See Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 3–4 (2002).
66. See ECHR, supra note 58, art. 9.
67. See Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 3–4.
68. See ECHR, supra note 58, art. 14.
69. See Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40.
70. See id. at 4–5.
71. Paul Raine, A Right to Die? The Case of Diane Pretty (2006) (on file with the Loyola of
Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review); Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 503.
72. Id.
73. Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, 2005, H.L. Bill [36] (Gr. Brit.).
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74

means of self-administration. Despite providing many of the same
safeguards as other countries’ assisted suicide laws—including
requirements of capacity, a terminal illness, an effective year-long
75
residency, and minimum waiting periods —the bill was rejected by the
76
House of Lords in May 2006. Since then, no other proposed law has
made it as far in the legislative process.77 In May 2009, however, Lord
Charles Falconer launched a campaign calling for the legal protection of
individuals who traveled abroad to assist loved ones in committing
78
suicide. His campaign achieved mixed results: the law remains
unchanged today, but recent steps taken by the DPP have somewhat
clarified the uncertainty surrounding the prosecution of assisted
suicide.79
In September 2009, the DPP provided this clarification by finally
agreeing to issue new guidelines regarding his office’s decisions to
80
prosecute cases of assisted suicide. Besides Diane Pretty, many others
had unsuccessfully petitioned the DPP to issue such guidelines for
decades. The most recent challenger, a woman named Debbie Purdy,
finally succeeded. Like Diane Pretty, Ms. Purdy, who had been
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, sought assurance from the DPP that
her husband would not be prosecuted for accompanying her abroad to
81
help her commit suicide. The DPP denied Ms. Purdy’s request, and the
U.K. courts rejected her subsequent legal challenge. Surprisingly,
however, in its decision, the House of Lords expressed support for
clarification of the DPP’s polices on prosecuting assisted suicide. 82 The
DPP obliged by issuing an interim policy, which established “public

74. Id. § 1.
75. See id. §§ 1–16; John Coggon & Søren Holm, The Assisted Dying Bill—”Death
Tourism” and European Law (2006), available at http://www.ccels.cf.ac.uk/archives/issues/2006/
coggon_holm.pdf.
76. Diana Hassel, Sex and Death: Lawrence’s Liberty and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 9 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1003, 1025 n.133 (2007).
77. See Isabel Oakeshott, Lord Falconer Backs Suicide Reform, SUNDAY TIMES (May 31,
2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6395949.ece.
78. Id.
79. See Liam Creedon, New Guidelines Ease Relatives’ Fear of Assisted Suicide,
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/
health-news/new-guidelines-ease-relatives-fear-of-assisted-suicide-1791910.html.
80. See id.
81. See Francis Gibb & Helen Nugent, MS Sufferer Loses Battle on Assisted Suicide, TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2008, at N1.
82. Id.
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interest factors” in support of, and against, prosecution. Following
publication of this policy, the DPP sought public consultation through a
collection of individual responses and comments to a series of questions
84
regarding the policy. After considering the public’s responses, the
DPP issued its final policy in February 2010.85
According to the new policy, “encouraging or assisting suicide”
86
remains an offense under the Suicide Act 1961. However, prosecutors
must now apply a “Full Code Test,” which is comprised of two stages:
87
an evidential stage and a public interest stage. A prosecution will only
proceed if first, the evidential stage is met, and second, a prosecution is
88
deemed necessary in the public interest. For the evidential stage, a
prosecutor must prove that: “[1] the suspect did an act capable of
encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another
person; and [2] the suspect’s act was intended to encourage or assist
89
suicide or an attempt at suicide.” If there is sufficient evidence of both
elements, the DPP will then consider whether prosecution is in the
public interest. The DPP does this by reviewing the facts and merits of
the particular case and weighing “public interest factors” both for and
90
against prosecution. Public interest factors in favor of prosecution
include whether the victim was under eighteen years of age or did not
have the capacity to reach an informed decision, and whether the
assisting party persuaded or pressured the victim into committing
91
suicide. Public interest factors against prosecution include whether the
victim made a voluntary and informed decision to commit suicide,
whether the assisting party was wholly motivated by compassion, and
whether the assisting party reported the victim’s suicide to the police
92
and fully assisted them in their investigation.
83. See DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, INTERIM POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF
CASES OF ASSISTED SUICIDE (2009), available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_
consultation.pdf.
84. See A Public Consultation on the DPP’s Interim Policy for Prosecutors on Assisted
Suicide, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_index.html (last
visited Sept. 6, 2011).
85. See Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of
Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (Feb. 2010), http://www.cps.gov.
uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html.
86. Id. ¶ 1.
87. Id. ¶ 13.
88. Id.
89. Id. ¶ 17.
90. Id. ¶¶ 38–39.
91. There are sixteen total factors that weigh in favor of prosecution. See id. ¶ 43(1)–(2), (5),
(7).
92. There are six total factors that weigh against prosecution. See id. ¶ 45(1)–(2), (6).
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The DPP announced that the new policy did not decriminalize
assisted suicide or assure any person that she will be immune from
93
prosecution for encouraging or assisting another in suicide. Rather, the
new policy is intended to “provide a clear framework for prosecutors to
94
decide which cases should proceed to court and which should not.”
While assisted suicide is still an offense punishable by up to fourteen
years imprisonment, the DPP acknowledged early on that the new
policy may lead to an increase in assisted suicide in the United
95
Kingdom. Certainly, there will be no flurry of assisted suicide clinics
opening in the country to welcome death tourists; but the new policy
may make it easier for British citizens to travel abroad for suicide with
reassurance that their loved ones will not be prosecuted for assisting
them. Only time will tell what kind of effect the new policy will have.
B. The United States
No federal law in the United States directly permits or prohibits
PAS or euthanasia. Instead, the right to legislate on end-of-life
procedures lies within the purview of the individual states.96 Currently,
only Oregon and Washington have enacted statutory provisions
97
allowing PAS under certain conditions. However, in Montana, a
district court judge declared in December 2008 that the State’s
constitution recognizes the right of terminally ill patients to “die with
dignity” by obtaining a prescription for lethal medication from their
98
physicians. The State Attorney General appealed the case to the
Montana Supreme Court, which issued a ruling in December 2009
affirming the district court’s judgment, albeit on much narrower
99
grounds. Specifically, the Court refrained from answering the
constitutional question whether terminally ill patients actually enjoy a
right to “die with dignity”; instead, the Court held that a physician’s aid
in a patient’s death does not violate the State’s public policy exception
93. Id. ¶ 6.
94. Press Release, Crown Prosecution Serv., DPP Publishes Assisted Suicide Policy,
available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/109_10/.
95. Caroline Davies, Assisted Suicide Guidelines Will Ease Fears, Says DPP, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 23, 2009, 21:23 BST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/sep/23/assisted-suicideguidelines-dpp.
96. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 798–99 (1997).
97. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.995 (2003); WASH.
REV. CODE. § 70.245 (2009).
98. Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482 (Dec. 5, 2008),
vacated, 2009 MT 449.
99. Kirk Johnson, Montana Ruling Bolsters Doctor-Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01suicide.html.
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100

to the consent defense.
The Court’s decision effectively makes
Montana the third state to legally recognize PAS, though that right has
not yet been codified by statute. Even with these states’ acceptance of
PAS, euthanasia remains illegal in every state.101
1. Judicial Background Regarding the Constitutionality of PAS
Several United States Supreme Court decisions from the past
twenty or so years have helped shape the current landscape of PAS
jurisprudence in the United States. In 1990, the Supreme Court faced
the question of whether the United States Constitution guaranteed a
102
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
The patient in that case,
Nancy Cruzan, suffered severe injuries in an automobile accident that
rendered her permanently disabled and in a “persistent vegetative
103
Her parents sought to remove Cruzan from an artificial
state.”
nutrition and hydration device that was keeping her alive. The Supreme
Court held that patients have the right, guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, to refuse
104
unwanted medical treatment.
The Court based its decision on
traditional common law principles of battery, bodily integrity, and
freedom from unwanted touching,105 declining to draw a corollary
between the right to refuse treatment and a “right to die with dignity.”106
In 1997, following the passage of Oregon’s assisted suicide law,
the Supreme Court issued a critical decision that threatened the rights of
assisted suicide supporters in the United States. In Washington v.
Glucksberg, the Court upheld a Washington state law that banned
assisted suicide, finding that the Constitution did not confer a
107
fundamental right to “commit suicide with another’s assistance.” The
Court balanced the patient’s asserted right to assistance in suicide
against the State’s multiple interests in preserving life, preventing
suicide, and protecting the integrity of the medical profession, and
concluded that Washington’s assisted suicide ban was reasonably
100. Baxter v. State, 2009 MT 449, 354 Mont. 234, 224 P.3d 1211. Under Montana law, a
victim’s consent to a crime is a defense to that crime. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 45, § 45-2-211(1)
(2009). However, there are four exceptions to the consent defense, the relevant one here being a
violation of public policy in recognizing the defense. Id. § 45-2-211(2).
101. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 804–05.
102. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
103. Id. at 265–66.
104. Id. at 277.
105. Id. at 269.
106. Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997).
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108

related to legitimate state interests. Opponents of Glucksberg have
criticized the Court’s narrow interpretation of the asserted right in that
case—to wit, the right to commit suicide with another’s assistance—and
have instead characterized it as a right to “die with dignity” or to choose
109
the means of one’s death. Advocates of PAS, however, have noted
that in its decision, the Court encouraged individuals to continue to
engage in “an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality,
110
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide.”
On the same day it decided Glucksberg, the Supreme Court ruled
in Vacco v. Quill that New York’s prohibition of PAS did not violate
111
The
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
plaintiffs in Vacco argued that the State of New York unfairly
discriminated against the rights of the terminally ill by permitting
competent patients to refuse medical treatment—as in Cruzan—while
112
forbidding patients from requesting assisted suicide.
The Court
rejected this argument and drew a clear line between refusing life113
sustaining treatment and requesting life-ending treatment. The Court
concluded that the State had acted rationally in differentiating between
these two competing rights and declared that the state’s laws followed a
114
“longstanding and rational distinction.”
Importantly, the Court’s
decision, insofar as it was based on its interpretation of the federal
Constitution, confirmed that the states were free to decide for
themselves whether their respective state constitutions recognized a
right to PAS or euthanasia.115
2. State Laws Recognizing PAS
In the midst of the Supreme Court’s adjudication of the right to
assisted suicide, Oregon became the first state to legalize PAS in limited
circumstances.116 Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA) was first
passed in 1994 by a state ballot measure that drew a fifty-one percent
117
vote of Oregon residents. After multiple legal challenges and court108. Id. at 728–32, 735.
109. See Yale Kamisar, Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of Life
and Personal Autonomy, 24 ISSUES L. & MED. 95, 102–03 (2008).
110. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
111. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997).
112. Id. at 797–98.
113. Id. at 800–01.
114. Id. at 807–08.
115. See id. at 799.
116. Srinivas, supra note 10, at 101.
117. Trevor Stiles, Gonzales v. Oregon and the Future of Agency-Made Criminal Law, 97 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1261, 1269 (2007).
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ordered injunctions delayed its enforcement, the law finally went into
effect in 1997, when Oregon voters rejected a measure to repeal the law
118
by a sixty percent vote.
The ODWDA allows competent, terminally ill patients who are
residents of Oregon to request PAS under certain conditions. It
provides:
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be
suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed
his or her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for
the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified
119
manner . . . .

Under the ODWDA, a patient is considered “capable” if, in the
opinion of the court or the patient’s attending or consulting physician,
psychiatrist, or psychologist, the patient is able to make and
120
The patient
communicate health care decisions to her physicians.
must be suffering from a terminal disease, defined by the ODWDA as
an incurable and irreversible disease that will, within reasonable
121
medical judgment, produce death within six months. The patient’s
122
decision to die must be voluntary and “informed,” and the patient
must make and sign a written request for lethal medication in the
presence of at least two witnesses, one of whom must not be a relative,
a person entitled to any part of the patient’s estate, or a health care
123
provider.
The attending physician must make the initial determination as to
whether the patient is capable, has a terminal disease, and has made the
124
request for medication voluntarily. The attending physician must also
ensure that the patient has made an informed decision, meaning that the
physician has informed the patient of: (1) the physician’s medical
diagnosis; (2) the physician’s prognosis; (3) the potential risks
associated with taking the prescribed medication; (4) the probable result
of taking the prescribed medication; and (5) the feasible alternatives,
125
Finally, the attending
including hospice care and pain control.
physician must refer the patient to a consulting physician, who must
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Cohen-Almagor, supra note 27, at 13.
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2003).
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800(3) (2003).
Id. § 127.800(12).
§ 127.830.
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810 (2003).
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815(1)(a) (2003).
Id. § 127.815(1)(c).
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confirm the attending physician’s diagnosis and verify that the patient is
126
capable and acting voluntarily. Once these requirements are satisfied,
the attending physician may write a prescription for lethal
medication;127 however, the attending physician must wait at least
fifteen days after the patient’s initial oral request, or at least forty-eight
hours after the patient’s written request, before providing the patient
128
with the prescription.
Oregon remained the only state to have legalized PAS for over a
decade.129 Then, in November 2008, voters in the State of Washington
130
approved a law that virtually mirrored the law in Oregon.
Washington’s Death with Dignity Act (WDWDA) contains nearly
identical language to its Oregon counterpart, differing only with respect
131
to a few trivial characteristics. The WDWDA includes all of the same
procedural requirements and safeguards as the ODWDA and shares its
fundamental purpose.
3. The Potential for Death Tourism
A unique feature of both the ODWDA and WDWDA, which
distinguishes these laws from those in the Netherlands and in
Switzerland, is that the patient must prove that she is a resident of the
132
state to qualify for PAS. In Oregon, the patient can prove residency
through some combination of possessing a state-issued driver’s license,
being registered to vote in the state, owning or leasing property in the
133
state, or filing a tax return in the state. In Washington, the same
134
criteria apply, with the exception of filing a tax return in the state.
These residency requirements act as buffers for death tourism.
Unlike the assisted suicide laws in the Netherlands and in Switzerland
(detailed below), Oregon and Washington’s assisted suicide laws make
it extremely difficult for foreign citizens to travel to the United States in
126. Id. § 127.815(1)(d); see id. § 127.815(1)(b), (e) (remaining requirements of the attending
physician).
127. Id. § 127.815(1)(L).
128. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.850 (2003).
129. Srinivas, supra note 10, at 101.
130. Id. at 101–02.
131. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.020(1) (West 2010) (using the word
“competent” rather than “capable,” and adding language indicating that the patient should selfadminister the medication prescribed by the attending physician); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.245.130 (West 2010) (omitting the ability to demonstrate residency in the state by providing
proof of a state tax return).
132. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.860 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.130 (West 2010).
133. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.860(1)–(4). These factors are not exhaustive. Id. § 127.860.
134. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.130 (West 2010).
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search of aid in death. In Oregon, it may be possible for a non-resident
patient to purchase land in the state and file a state tax return.135
However, the factors are not dispositive in establishing residency for
136
and would nevertheless make death
purposes of the ODWDA,
tourism an incredibly expensive endeavor. Moreover, even a patient
who goes through the trouble of establishing a residence in Oregon must
satisfy additional criteria, such as having a terminal illness and
137
demonstrating capability to make the request for assisted suicide. The
statutorily defined terminal illness requirement itself poses significant
hardship, as a patient who is expected to die within six months would
likely find it too burdensome to devise a plan to feign residency in the
state.
In addition to the residency requirements, the minimum waiting
periods between the patient’s request and receipt of the prescription
specified by the ODWDA and WDWDA limit the opportunities for
death tourism. Under both Acts, at least fifteen days must pass between
the patient’s initial oral request and the physician’s grant of the
prescription, and at least forty-eight hours must pass after the patient’s
138
written request. These waiting periods prevent hasty action, ensuring
that the patient exercises extreme diligence and care in her decision to
request and ultimately carry out her own death. Furthermore, both Acts
stipulate that the attending physician must offer the patient the
opportunity to rescind her request before providing the prescription, and
explicitly give the patient the right to rescind her request even when not
139
asked by the physician. Such strict time requirements prevent patients
from being able to request assisted suicide in the morning and have that
request granted by the afternoon. When viewed in conjunction with the
Acts’ residency requirements, it is no surprise that there have been few,
if any, reports of patients moving to Oregon or Washington to take
140
advantage of their assisted suicide laws.
C. The Netherlands
In 2001, the Netherlands became the first country to legally
recognize both PAS and euthanasia with the passage of the Termination
135. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.860.
136. See id.
137. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.020(1) (West 2010).
138. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.110 (West 2010).
139. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.840 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.845 (2003); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.245.090 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.100 (West 2010).
140. See Srinivas, supra note 10, at 101.

2011]

A Call for International Regulation

305
141

of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act (TLRSA). Prior to 2001,
assisted suicide and euthanasia had been “practiced and tolerated” in the
Netherlands for several decades, despite the country’s ban on both
142
In the mid-twentieth century, developments in medical
practices.
technology and the maturation of a doctor-patient relationship opened
143
the door for discussion regarding end-of-life procedures. In 1984, in
the landmark case of Schoonheim, the Dutch Supreme Court announced
an exception to the country’s laws prohibiting assisted suicide and
euthanasia.144 In Schoonheim, a physician administered a lethal injection
to a ninety-five-year-old woman following repeated requests from her
that the physician end her life.145 For the first time, the Supreme Court
held that the physician’s conduct was justified under a theory of
“necessity” (or overmacht), finding that the physician acted
appropriately after weighing his conflicting duties to end the patient’s
146
suffering on the one hand and to preserve her life on the other.
In 1994, the Dutch Supreme Court extended the scope of the
physician’s “necessity” defense in a case called Chabot.147 There, a
physician provided lethal medication to a patient who was experiencing
major depression and intense psychological suffering, but had no
terminal illness. The Supreme Court held that the “necessity” defense
applied even where the patient was not terminally ill and was suffering
148
After Chabot, the Dutch
from purely psychological symptoms.
Parliament made several unsuccessful attempts to legalize PAS and
149
euthanasia. Finally, in 2001, Parliament passed the TLRSA.150

141. Wet Toetsing Levensbeëindiging op Verzoek en Hulp Bij Zelfdoding [Termination of
Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act], Stb. 2001, nr. 194 (Neth.)
[hereinafter TLRSA], available at http://www.nvve.nl/nvve-english/pagina.asp?pagkey=72087
(English trans.).
142. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 27, at 5.
143. See JOHN GRIFFITHS ET AL., EUTHANASIA AND LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 46–49
(1998).
144. HR 27 november 1984, NJ 1985, 106 m.nt. (Schoonheim) (Neth.), translated in
GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 143, at 322–28.
145. Id. at 323.
146. Neil M. Gorsuch, The Legalization of Assisted Suicide and the Law of Unintended
Consequences: A Review of the Dutch and Oregon Experiments and Leading Utilitarian
Arguments for Legal Change, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1347, 1355 (2004).
147. HR 21 juni 1994, NJ 1994, 656 m.nt. (Chabot) (Neth.), translated in GRIFFITHS ET AL.,
supra note 143, at 329–40.
148. Gorsuch, supra note 146, at 1356–57.
149. Id. at 1357.
150. Id.
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1. The Netherlands’ Assisted Suicide Law
Interestingly, the TLRSA, which went into effect in April 2002,151
did not explicitly legalize PAS and euthanasia; rather, it exempted from
152
prosecution physicians who followed a specific due care requirement.
The Act amended Articles 293 and 294 of the Dutch Penal Code—
153
which, respectively, made it a crime to “take another person’s life,”
154
and to “intentionally incite or assist another in committing suicide” —
by adding a paragraph that immunized physicians who satisfied the due
care requirements outlined in Article 2 of the Act. These due care
requirements are met where the physician:
a. holds the conviction that the request by the patient was voluntary
and well-considered,
b. holds the conviction that the patient’s suffering was lasting and
unbearable,
c. informed the patient about the situation he was in and about his
prospects,
d. and the patient hold the conviction that there was no other
reasonable solution for the situation he was in,
e. has consulted at least one other, independent physician who has
seen the patient and has given his written opinion on the
requirements of due care, referred to in parts a–d, and
155
f. has terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with due care.

The Act also provides for PAS and euthanasia for minors as long as the
minor’s parents are “involved in the decision process” (if the minor is
between the ages of sixteen and eighteen)156 or explicitly consent (if the
157
minor is between the ages of twelve and sixteen).
Thus, under the TLRSA, both euthanasia and assisted suicide are
permissible, as long as the treating physician satisfies the Act’s due care
requirements. According to the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and
Sport, euthanasia is understood as “the termination of life by a doctor at
the patient’s request, with the aim of putting an end to unbearable
158
suffering with no prospect of improvement.” In the Ministry’s view,
TLRSA, supra note 141.
See id. art. 293, ¶ 2.
See SR. art. 293 (Neth.), translated in GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 143, at 308.
Id.
TLRSA, supra note 141, art. 2.
Id. art. 2, ¶ 3.
Id. art. 2, ¶ 4.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, WELFARE AND SPORT, EUTHANASIA: THE NETHERLANDS’ NEW
RULES 2 (2002), available at http://english.minvws.nl/includes/dl/openbestand.asp?File=/images
/broch-euthanasia-eng_tcm20-108102.pdf.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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this definition includes assisted suicide. “Withdrawing or refraining
from medical treatment at a patient’s request,” however, is not
considered euthanasia; nor is a physician’s attempt to relieve pain with
160
strong medication that incidentally hastens the patient’s death.
The TLRSA does not require a patient seeking assistance in death
to suffer from a terminal illness. Instead, the Act simply mandates that
161
the patient’s suffering be “lasting and unbearable.” In addition, the
TLRSA lacks a requirement that the physician assess the patient’s
competence to request death. While the Act does require physicians to
ensure that the patient’s request was “voluntary and well-considered,”
and that the patient has accepted “that there was no other reasonable
162
solution,” the Act leaves open the possibility that patients with severe
psychological illnesses, such as major depression or schizophrenia, may
be granted assistance in death despite a potential lack of competence in
requesting it.
2. The Netherlands as a Potential Death Tourist Destination
The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport has downplayed the
idea that the Netherlands can serve as an attractive death tourist
destination. In response to the question, “Can patients from other
countries come to the Netherlands for euthanasia?” the Ministry has
stated:
No. This cannot happen because a close doctor-patient relationship is
required. Under the new Act, a patient’s suffering must be
unbearable, with no prospect of improvement, and his request for
euthanasia must be voluntary, carefully considered and repeated. To
assess these criteria, a doctor has to know a patient well. This means
that the patient needs to have been seeing the doctor for some time
163
already.

Contrary to the Ministry’s position, it is, in fact, feasible for the
Netherlands to play a role in the death tourism industry. Although a
close doctor-patient relationship is endorsed, several of the TLRSA’s
provisions actually undermine the Ministry’s stance. First, noticeably
absent from the TLRSA’s criteria is a requirement that the patient be a
resident of the Netherlands. Second, while the TLRSA requires the
treating physician to consult an independent physician, who must see
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
TLRSA, supra note 141, art. 2, ¶ 1(b).
Id. art. 2, ¶ 1(a), (d).
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, WELFARE AND SPORT, supra note 158, at 9.
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the patient and confirm in writing the requirements of due care, the
Act does not dictate a specific amount of time required between the
patient’s initial request for death, the two physicians’ evaluations, and
the ultimate life-ending act. Consequently, it is conceivable that a
foreign citizen could travel to the Netherlands, see a primary and
consulting physician in a matter of days, and be assisted in death.
Finally, the TLRSA’s omission of a terminal illness requirement makes
the Netherlands an attractive option for a wider group of potential death
tourists, including those suffering from depression, physical disabilities,
and other non-life-threatening illnesses.
Despite these factors, death tourism has thus far not proven to be a
significant concern in the Netherlands. This may be attributed to the
culture of the Dutch medical community, which favors long-standing
165
relationships between physicians and patients, making it unlikely that
a physician would agree to assist a patient in death after having just met
and evaluated her. Additionally, Dutch physicians enjoy wide discretion
in deciding whether to grant a patient’s request for PAS or
166
euthanasia, providing another explanation for the rare incidence of
death tourism in the country. Still, the language of the TLRSA makes
the Netherlands a more viable death tourist destination than its leaders
would care to admit.
D. Switzerland
This Note has thus far considered the laws of three countries: the
United Kingdom—where both assisted suicide and euthanasia are
strictly forbidden, though new guidelines issued by the DPP may relax
the prosecution of assisted suicide in some cases; the United States—
where only Oregon and Washington have passed laws permitting PAS
in certain situations, and euthanasia remains unconditionally prohibited;
and the Netherlands—where assisted suicide and euthanasia are allowed
as long as the physician satisfies the TLRSA’s requirements of due care.
At this point, it is important to mention that in addition to the
Netherlands and the aforementioned states in the United States, there
are only three other countries that currently allow assisted suicide.
167
Those countries are Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. This

164.
165.
166.
167.

TLRSA, supra note 141, art. 2, ¶ 1(e).
See Green, supra note 28, at 679.
See GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 143, at 304.
Srinivas, supra note 10, at 103.
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168

Note does not address the laws of the former two, but will instead
focus on the latter country in this final part of the analysis.
1. The Law in Switzerland
Switzerland currently boasts the most liberal assisted suicide laws
169
of any country in the world. It has approved of the practice for over
170
sixty years. Although it does not permit euthanasia, the Swiss law
contains several key features that make the country the most popular
destination for death tourists today.171
Articles 114 and 115 of the Swiss Penal Code govern end-of-life
jurisprudence in Switzerland. Article 114 provides, “[a] person who, for
decent reasons, especially compassion, kills a person on the basis of his
or her serious and insistent request, will be sentenced to a term of
172
imprisonment [between three days and three years].” In other words,
active euthanasia is expressly banned. Article 115 provides, “[a] person
who, for selfish reasons, incites someone to commit suicide or who
assists that person in doing so will, if the suicide was carried out or
attempted, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment [. . .] of up to five
173
years.” The negative implication of this provision is that a person
who assists another in committing suicide for unselfish reasons will not
be punished. Such, in fact, is precisely the case: assisted suicide is
permissible under Swiss law as long as the assisting party is not
motivated by selfishness.174
There are several important aspects of the Swiss law that
distinguish it from that of other countries. First, and most strikingly, the
Swiss law does not limit assisted suicide to physicians.175 Thus, whereas
the Netherlands and the States of Oregon and Washington require a
physician to oversee the patient’s death, the Swiss law allows any
individual to assist another in committing suicide. This is especially
168. The law in Belgium is similar both facially and in practice to the law in the Netherlands,
and as a result, its analysis will not provide any additional insight to this Note. On the other hand,
Luxembourg’s assisted suicide law did not go into effect until late 2008, and there is not yet
enough data concerning its impact to sufficiently analyze it.
169. See Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 509–10.
170. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 27, at 21.
171. See Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 512–13; Srinivas, supra note 10, at 109–10.
172. CHRISTIAN SCHWARZENEGGER & SARAH J. SUMMERS, CRIMINAL LAW AND ASSISTED
SUICIDE IN SWITZERLAND: HEARING WITH THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE ASSISTED DYING
FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL BILL, HOUSE OF LORDS 3 (2005), available at http://www.rwi.uzh.ch/
lehreforschung/alphabetisch/schwarzenegger/publikationen/assisted-suicide-Switzerland.pdf.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Srinivas, supra note 10, at 105.
175. Id. at 106.
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significant because the lack of legally-mandated physician presence
enables clinics such as Dignitas to operate using clinical workers and
volunteers. Second, the Swiss law does not require a second opinion
from a consulting physician before the patient is granted her request to
176
die.
This omission is in stark contrast to the laws of both the
Netherlands and the United States, where attending physicians must
refer the patient to a consulting physician before providing the patient
with a prescription for lethal medication. In practice, these first two
features of the Swiss law make it possible to grant a patient assistance in
177
suicide relatively quickly after she makes her initial request.
A third significant feature of the Swiss law is that it does not
require that the patient be terminally ill or suffer from a severe physical
disability.178 This aspect of the law has generated perhaps the most
criticism from the international community.179 Dignitas founder Ludwig
Minelli has openly advocated helping healthy individuals commit
suicide, and has admitted that the Dignitas clinic helps kill non180
terminally ill patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
Although the Dutch law also lacks a terminal illness requirement, the
TLRSA nevertheless requires the patient’s suffering to be “lasting and
unbearable,” and the physician must be certain that the patient’s request
181
was voluntary and well-considered. Under the Swiss law, however,
the combination of assistance to the non-terminally ill and failure to
ensure the patient’s competence and voluntariness results in the realistic
possibility of patients being killed even if they are suffering from
mental disorders that adversely affect their decision-making abilities.
In addition to these features, the Swiss law’s final defining
characteristic, the absence of a residency requirement, makes
Switzerland the most popular destination for death tourists. Indeed, as
one commentator has stated, “[p]erhaps the status of the Netherlands
and Belgium (and eventually Luxembourg) as death-tourism

176. Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 509–10.
177. But see Ludwig A. Minelli, Secretary General, Speech at the Friends at the End (FATE)
London Meeting 6 (Dec. 1, 2007), available at http://www.dignitas.ch/images/stories/pdf/
diginpublic/referat-dignitas-in-switzerland-fate-01122007.pdf (stating that the period between the
patient’s request and the “provisional green light” varies between three and eight hundred days,
with an average of seventy-seven days).
178. See Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 509–10.
179. See supra Part I.
180. See David Brown, Dignitas Founder Plans Assisted Suicide of Healthy Woman,
SUNDAY TIMES (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article602
1947.ece.
181. TLRSA, supra note 141, art. 2.
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destinations remains untested because Switzerland offers an
182
unambiguous opportunity for assisted suicide abroad.”
Thousands of individuals have been assisted in obtaining death in
one of Switzerland’s several assisted suicide clinics. The largest of these
clinics, EXIT, has been operating since 1982 and currently has over
183
fifty thousand members. EXIT sets itself apart from Dignitas in a
number of ways. Although Swiss law does not require it, EXIT only
184
accepts terminally ill or severely suffering patients.
EXIT also
ensures that patients have proper capacity to request assisted suicide and
will not grant such a request if the patient is suffering from
185
Finally, EXIT only accommodates Swiss citizens or
depression.
186
foreign citizens who permanently reside in Switzerland. In light of
these practices, it appears that EXIT is not a significant player in the
death tourism industry.
Dignitas is reportedly the only clinic that accepts non-resident
patients. It is thus the driving force behind the death tourism
phenomenon. Dignitas has helped hundreds of foreign citizens commit
suicide, more than one hundred of whom have come from the United
187
Kingdom.
It also currently possesses over eight hundred British
188
members, and more than half of its non-resident patients have come
189
from the United Kingdom and Germany. Minelli has stated that he
believes the right to die is the very last human right, and there can be no
discrimination in the granting of this right simply based on an
190
Therefore, he sees no reason to restrict
individual’s residence.
Dignitas’s services solely to citizens or residents of Switzerland.
According to Minelli, media reports that patients can arrive at the
191
clinic and commit suicide that same day are sensationalized.
He
claims that there is a more formal process in place: first, the patient has
to become a member of Dignitas, which includes paying a registration
182. Srinivas, supra note 10, at 105.
183. See EXIT auf einen Blick, http://www.exit.ch/wDeutsch/2110002/exit_auf_einen_blick.
php?navanchor=2110029 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
184. Rodrigo Carrizo Couto, Assisted Suicide Activist Speaks Out on Debate, SWISSINFO.CH,
(Dec. 18, 2008, 21:12), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Assisted_suicide_activist_speaks_out_on_
debate.html?cid=7107364 (interview with Swiss surgeon and president of EXIT, Jérôme Sobel).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Roger Boyes, Swiss Crackdown on “Suicide Tourism” Could Spell End of Dignitas
Clinic, TIMES (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article6894
726.ece (noting that at least 119 British citizens have ended their lives at Dignitas).
188. See id.
189. Pfeffer, supra note 24, at 512.
190. Minelli, supra note 177, at 3.
191. Id. at 6.
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fee and annual membership; then, the patient must send a letter of
192
request and her medical file.
Once a patient takes these steps,
Dignitas arranges an appointment for the patient with a physician (recall
that the Swiss law does not require a physician to participate in the
assisted suicide), who will meet with the patient and ultimately
193
determine whether he will write a prescription for lethal medication.
Minelli emphasizes that, in accordance with the Swiss prohibition on
euthanasia, the patient must be able to take the ultimate life-ending act
194
herself.
Despite Minelli’s assurances that Dignitas takes procedural
precautions against death tourists, the clinic remains the most viable
option for patients seeking a “quick death.” The Swiss assisted suicide
law has no residency or terminal illness requirement and does not
mandate that the assisting party be a physician; the law only prohibits
195
assisted suicide for selfish reasons. While EXIT nevertheless accepts
primarily Swiss patients who are terminally ill or severely suffering,
Dignitas accommodates a much wider range of patients seeking death.
As a result of Switzerland’s permissive assisted suicide law, Dignitas
has established the country as the death tourist capital of the world.
2. The Future of Dignitas
For all of the criticism it has endured, Dignitas remains committed
to its goals and methods. However, in the wake of the Downes’ story
and increasingly intense debate about the clinic’s practices, the Swiss
government has threatened tighter regulations of assisted suicide
organizations and possible closure of the Dignitas clinic. In October
196
the first
2009, the government proposed two bills for public debate:
of these bills proposed stricter duties of care for employees of assisted
suicide organizations, while the second bill proposed a complete ban on
197
organized assisted suicide. Groups of cantons, political parties, and
other organizations deliberated on the bills, and while a majority
ultimately rejected both, they agreed that some type of federal-level
198
The first bill, which would have required
action was necessary.
assisted suicide patients to be terminally ill and three physicians to
confirm a patient’s legal capacity to make the decision and verify the
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6.
Srinivas, supra note 10, at 105–06.
Boyes, supra note 187.
See Swiss Federal Council Press Release, supra note 12.
Id.
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presence of a terminal illness, was criticized as too complex, opaque,
199
and discriminatory. The second bill, which would have completely
banned the practices of assisted suicide clinics, was rejected as an
200
unlawful restriction on the patient’s right of self-determination.
Recognizing the desire of the public for some type of regulation of
assisted suicide organizations, in September 2010, the Swiss Federal
Council announced that it would instruct the Federal Department of
Justice and Police to revise the first bill and the Federal Department of
Home Affairs to make recommendations to improve suicide prevention
201
Both bodies were expected to submit their
and palliative care.
202
proposals to the Swiss parliament by the end of 2010, at which point
parliament would engage in a debate over a future course of action.
According to Justice Minister Markus Notter, any new legislation would
not ban suicide trips to Switzerland, but would effectively end “quick
203
suicides” for foreign citizens.
Although it is possible that new
legislation may force Dignitas to significantly change its practices, the
opportunities created by Switzerland’s assisted suicide law could lead to
the establishment of more clinics like Dignitas that accommodate death
tourists.
IV. SOFT LAW REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL DEATH TOURISM
Death tourism is a divisive issue that engenders public and
political debate about a largely private and non-political topic. It
produces a wide array of opinions, based on varying ideological beliefs
and political views. Some may consider death tourism a wonderful
possibility, one that recognizes the fundamental right to “die with
dignity” and grants patients an opportunity to achieve that which their
own country denies them.204 Others, however, may perceive death
tourism as an exploitative venture, one that disregards legal principles
of comity and sovereignty.
Those who fall into the first category might wonder: Why do
anything about death tourism at all? How is death tourism any different
from individuals traveling to foreign countries and engaging in activities
that are unavailable or forbidden in their own countries? After all,
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. John Jalsevac, Switzerland Attempting to Curb “Suicide Tourism” with Stricter
Regulations, LIFESITENEWS.COM (July 20, 2009, 11:15), http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/
archive/ldn/2009/jul/09072007.
204. Minelli, supra note 177, at 1.
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assisted suicide is legal in Switzerland. What obligation does
Switzerland have to actively deny British citizens the same right it
extends to its own citizens? These questions are legitimate and wellfounded. As mentioned earlier, this Note’s purpose is not to advocate or
object to assisted suicide. Rather, this Note argues that assisted suicide
is inherently different from any other activity in which citizens engage
while abroad. The moral implications of assisted suicide and its
unalterable finality distinguish it from such activities as experimenting
with illicit drugs or engaging in benign mischief. It is a practice to
which nations have been afforded a margin of appreciation in regulation
205
and enforcement. Because of its unique and absolute consequences,
assisted suicide transcends domestic restrictions and implicates core
principles of sovereignty and international comity. The current system,
which encourages individuals to shop for clinics that abide by the least
restrictive assisted suicide laws, offends these core principles and
should be regulated.
At first glance, it appears that death tourism is largely an internal
phenomenon, operating solely in Switzerland, and even more
exclusively, only in the Dignitas clinic. However, as mentioned above,
Switzerland’s position as the unequivocal leader of the death tourism
industry may explain why countries such as the Netherlands and
206
Even the prospective
Belgium have not drawn similar appeal.
domestic regulation of clinics such as Dignitas may not fully inhibit the
trend, as current laws leave open the possibility that other clinics in
Switzerland or elsewhere may emerge. Therefore, international
regulation of death tourism is essential in curtailing the practice.
The most effective tool for curtailing death tourism is an
instrument of soft law. As explained below, the informality and
flexibility of soft law, as well as its persuasive mechanisms, make it
uniquely suited for regulating morally and ethically charged issues such
as assisted suicide. Part A defines soft law and distinguishes it from the
traditional concept of hard law. Part B then explains why soft law
provides a more favorable means of regulating death tourism than a
hard law alternative.

205. See Emily Wada, Note, A Pretty Picture: The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to
Assisted Suicide, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 275–79 (2005) (explaining that the
margin of appreciation is a degree of discretion that courts have afforded states in the regulation
of assisted suicide).
206. Srinivas, supra note 10, at 105.
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A. Soft Law as a Less Formal and More Conciliatory Framework Than
Hard Law
There are several approaches to defining soft law. As Professor
Andrew T. Guzman explains, one approach is to identify what soft law
207
is not. It is not hard law, “meaning [it is not] treaties or custom, nor is
it a purely political understanding without a legal component.”208
209
Another
Instead, it is “what lies between these two alternatives.”
approach is to define soft law as a system of norms or principles that
210
guide states’ actions, rather than a framework of formal rules. In its
clearest sense, soft law is a non-binding, informal instrument of
international law that imposes moral or political commitments on
nations, rather than legal obligations. It includes instruments such as
211
declarations, recommendations, charters, and resolutions.
Soft law differs in several important respects from hard law, the
“classic” concept of international law. The most basic difference is that
soft law is non-binding. Thus, whereas hard law has actual binding
effect (such as a treaty upon ratification, or a custom that has
212
“hardened” into actual law), soft law is only “potentially binding.” In
other words, soft law can be conceived as a proposal that will gradually
evolve into hard law. A clear example of this is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which has, since its creation in 1948,
213
gained acceptance as customary international law.
A second
difference between soft and hard law is that soft law is less formal, and
thus involves fewer procedural costs and enables quicker
implementation than a treaty, which requires formal ratification.214 A
third difference is in the enforcement of soft and hard law. Unlike hard
law, which is more readily enforceable through judicial intervention,
dispute resolution, or sanctions, soft law depends almost entirely on the
willingness of states to regulate their own actions and fulfill their own
commitments. These differences lead many to dismiss soft law as a
weaker form of an already practically unenforceable international legal
207. Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579,
583 n.18 (2005).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 901, 901–02 (1999).
211. Roberto Andorno, The Invaluable Role of Soft Law in the Development of Universal
Norms in Bioethics, UNESCO (July 2007), http://www.unesco.de/1507.html?&L=0.
212. See id.
213. Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 499, 505 (1999).
214. See Andorno, supra note 211.
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215

system. In contrast to this view, however, there are advantages to
adopting a soft law instrument instead of a hard law instrument.
The fact that soft law is non-binding encourages states to agree to
its terms. Soft law’s non-binding effect assures states that they will not
be sanctioned for violating an agreement, and gives states flexibility in
determining the extent of their obligations. One may wonder: If the
agreement is non-binding, then what is the point of implementing it at
all? The answer is that more states are likely to acquiesce to the
agreement, which can lead to international compromise and mutually
216
Furthermore, in the absence of direct
beneficial cooperation.
sanctions, non-binding agreements can still impose “reputational”
sanctions, which can be just as costly for states in the international
arena. For example, states that violate international commitments signal
to other states that they do not take such commitments seriously. Thus,
when these states seek to enter into more formal agreements in the
future, other states will take into account their previous actions and may
be less willing to make concessions or compromises to accommodate
217
the offending states.
In addition, the informality of soft law instruments makes the
process of agreeing to them much simpler than that for hard law
instruments. The lack of a requirement of ratification allows states to
reduce their “contracting costs,” such as the costs of negotiating and
consulting with legal specialists, as well as their “sovereignty costs,”
such as the potential for inferior outcomes, loss of authority and control,
218
and the diminution of sovereignty. Without these costs, states are
much more willing to acquiesce to certain commitments and to
recognize their obligations under those commitments. The less formal
framework of soft law also provides for quicker implementation and a
219
than would a long and
more direct influence on states’ behavior
drawn out treaty-making process.
220
Finally, the soft enforcement, or “dispute avoidance,” of soft law
can lead to more cooperative and conciliatory resolution of disputes.
Rather than being adjudicated in an international court or subjected to
compulsory settlement procedures, soft enforcement can take the form
of negotiated inducements through a neutral third party or independent
215. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422–23 (2000).
216. Id. at 423.
217. Guzman, supra note 207, at 596.
218. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 215, at 434–37.
219. See Andorno, supra note 211.
220. Boyle, supra note 210, at 909.
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problem solving. Professor Alan E. Boyle cites the non-compliance
procedure adopted by the parties to the 1987 Montreal Protocol to the
221
Ozone Convention as an example.
Any party to the protocol can
invoke the procedure, at which point the matter is referred to an
Implementation Committee for investigation. The committee considers
the information at hand and produces a report that calls for an amicable
solution.222 This solution can include the provision of financial,
technical, or training assistance to the non-complying party. If this is
insufficient, the committee can issue a caution against the party, or even
223
suspend its rights if necessary. Whatever the ultimate solution, its
significance is that soft law enforcement avoids obligatory and
adversarial dispute resolution, and thus protects the legal interests of the
parties involved.
B. A Soft Law Instrument is Favorable in Dealing with Death Tourism
With this backdrop of hard versus soft law in mind, it is evident
that an instrument of soft law would most effectively curtail death
tourism. A multilateral treaty is neither prudent nor feasible in this
context. Indeed, Switzerland has no incentive in ratifying a treaty that
prohibits it from extending its own assisted suicide guarantees simply
on the basis of residency. Although its assisted suicide clinics are non224
profit, Switzerland’s economy undoubtedly benefits from being the
sole destination for many prospective PAS patients and their families. It
would be an egregious affront to the country’s sovereignty if it were
forced to deny a valid and legal protection of its laws to non-residents.
Switzerland would suffer extremely high “sovereignty costs” in such an
arrangement, and would face the threat of monetary sanctions for
essentially abiding by its own laws within its jurisdiction.
Instead of a treaty, the United Nations General Assembly should
propose a recommendation to decrease the incidence of death tourism.
This recommendation should call for international comity through the
recognition of, and respect for, other nations’ assisted suicide laws.
Thus, a non-terminally ill British citizen, who faces a ban against
assisted suicide in her own country, would not be able to travel to
Switzerland to be assisted in death in disregard of the U.K.’s assisted
suicide protocol. Similarly, a United States citizen residing in
221. Id. at 910.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Amelia Gentleman, Inside the Dignitas House, GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/nov/18/assisted-suicide-dignitas-house.
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California, who suffers from lasting and unbearable pain as a result of a
physical injury, would not be able to travel to the Netherlands and be
euthanized after meeting with an attending and consulting physician.
The recommendation would not ban assisted suicide or attempt to
influence states’ legislation on the subject within their own territory.
Rather, it would simply call on states to abide by their neighbors’ laws
in the context of assisted suicide and prevent the spread of death
tourism.
A recommendation from the General Assembly would necessarily
be non-binding on the states that adopt it. Notwithstanding this aspect of
the proposal, it is likely that a large number of states would agree to its
terms. Only three states in the United States and four other countries in
225
the world legally recognize some form of assisted suicide. In one way
or another, nearly all of these countries have dismissed or expressed
226
concern over its potential as a death tourist destination. Therefore, it
is not overly ambitious to predict that nearly every state that is asked to
adopt the recommendation would do so. Those states that refuse to,
while not in violation of any legal obligation, could face international
pressure from states that either prohibit or heavily regulate assisted
suicide.
Additionally, the recommendation’s informal nature would lead to
quick implementation and an almost immediate impact on states’
behavior. States would face little to no contracting costs in adopting the
recommendation and would retain substantial flexibility in framing their
own assisted suicide laws.
Finally, the soft enforcement mechanism afforded by the
recommendation would grant states relative freedom in settling disputes
if a party violates its commitment. States may choose to form an
independent committee to oversee the regulation of the recommendation
or they may choose to separately engage in cooperative dispute
resolution. The recommendation would effectively serve to inform
states of their mutual commitments, while simultaneously preserving
their rights as sovereign nations to pass their own laws and govern
behavior within their own borders.
V. CONCLUSION
Death tourism is a phenomenon that has produced both wideranging debate about the legitimacy of end-of-life practices and
225. Srinivas, supra note 10, at 102–03.
226. See Swiss Federal Council Press Release, supra note 12; MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
WELFARE AND SPORT, supra note 158, at 9.
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declarations by international leaders that their countries will not become
breeding grounds for death tourists. It has prompted individuals to
appeal to their countries’ lawmakers to legalize assisted suicide so that
terminally ill patients would not have to travel abroad to end their
suffering. Regardless of one’s views about the legality or morality of
assisted suicide, most would agree that a one-way ticket for a “quick
death” is hardly equivalent to a vacation that involves some
irresponsible recreational activities. Still, proponents of assisted suicide
may maintain that death tourists are simply taking advantage of duly
enacted laws that govern the countries to which they travel.
There are currently only a handful of nations that allow assisted
suicide.227 Of these nations, only Switzerland has thus far played a
significant role in the death tourism industry.228 A change in Swiss law,
however, is not necessary to deal with death tourism. As a sovereign
nation, Switzerland has every right to pass laws legalizing assisted
suicide. Rather, this is an issue that demands international regulation.
An instrument of soft law, in the form of a recommendation from
the United Nations General Assembly, would be the most effective tool
for reducing death tourism. The recommendation would be non-binding,
yet it would attract the vast majority of countries that are asked to adopt
it. It would grant states flexibility in determining their own obligations,
while placing pressure on those states that are reluctant to fulfill their
commitments. The recommendation’s informal nature would allow it to
go into effect almost immediately, which would result in a direct and
rapid influence on states’ actions. Finally, it would encourage
cooperative dispute resolution and help states avoid the high costs of
formal adoption, implementation, and enforcement.
Sir Edward and Lady Joan were neither the first nor likely the last
couple to achieve their wish of dying together. Without proper
international regulation of death tourism in place, it will not be long
before a severely depressed, yet physically healthy teenager is able to
purchase a train ticket to a neighboring country and convince a
volunteer clinical worker that she would like to end her life.

227. See Srinivas, supra note 10, at 103.
228. Id. at 105.

